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The United States government has been campaigning to encourage people to take 
HIV testing and thus get treated. It is puzzling that more than 50% of States have 
HIV-specific criminal laws that criminalize both exposure and transmission. At the 
same time, there is an increased tort law to seek financial compensation for 
unwanted HIV exposure and transmission. While both laws the moral claim of 
protecting people from HIV infection, this paper is trying to find an answer to the 
following inquiry: What is the difference of the moral reading between the use of 
criminal law and tort law in addressing HIV prevention in the United States? This 
paper uses the traditional descriptive comparison between criminal law and tort 
law under the American legal system with a nationwide jurisdictional scope. This 
paper measures the difference using the frame of reference of Ronald Dworkin's 
law, morality, and interpretation theory. Both criminal law and tort law have been 
developing similar liability principles regarding HIV exposure and transmission 
under the United States' common law tradition. For HIV prevention itself, both 
criminal law and tort law play a marginal role in gaining public health purposes 
in reversing the HIV epidemic. Criminal law has been scrutinized as not aligned 
with the purpose of law where misconceptions exist in both substantive dimension 
and the underlying moral claim. Tort law, on the other hand, suffers an even less 
moral claim on public health purposes. However, tort law maintains a consistent 
narrow sense of financial liability. 
 




Pemerintah Amerika Serikat telah berkampanye untuk mendorong orang untuk 
melakukan tes HIV dalam rangka pemberian pengobatan. Namun, terdapat anomali 
bahwa lebih dari 50% negara memiliki hukum pidana khusus HIV yang 
mengkriminalisasi paparan dan penularan virus. Pada saat yang sama, terdapat  
peningkatan hukum gugatan kerugian untuk mencari kompensasi finansial terkait 
kasus paparan dan penularan HIV yang tidak diinginkan. Sementara kedua hukum 
tersebut (hukum pidana dan hukum gugatan kerugian)  memilki klaim moral untuk 
melindungi orang dari infeksi HIV. Tulisan ini mencoba menjawab pertanyaan 
berikut: Apa perbedaan pemahaman moral antara penggunaan hukum pidana dan 
hukum kerugian dalam menangani pencegahan HIV di Amerika Serikat? Makalah 
ini menggunakan perbandingan deskriptif tradisional antara hukum pidana dan 
hukum gugatan kerugian di bawah sistem hukum Amerika dengan lingkup 
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yurisdiksi nasional. Tulisan ini mengukur perbedaan tersebut dengan menggunakan 
kerangka acuan hukum, moralitas, dan teori interpretasi Ronald Dworkin. Baik 
hukum pidana maupun gugatan kerugian telah mengembangkan prinsip-prinsip 
tanggung jawab yang serupa mengenai pajanan dan penularan HIV di bawah tradisi 
hukum umum Amerika Serikat. Untuk pencegahan HIV itu sendiri, baik hukum 
pidana maupun hukum kerugian memainkan peran kecil dalam mencapai tujuan 
kesehatan masyarakat dalam membalikkan epidemi HIV. Hukum pidana telah 
dipandang tidak selaras dengan tujuan hukum di mana kesalahpahaman ada baik 
dalam dimensi substantif dan klaim moral yang mendasarinya. Hukum gugatan, di 
sisi lain, memiliki klai moral yang terbatas dalam hal tujuan kesehatan masyarakat. 
Namun, hukum gugatan mempertahankan rasa tanggung jawab keuangan yang 
spesifik dan konsisten. 
 





More than 1.2 million people are 
living with HIV in the United States 
since the 1980s.1 According to the 
Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, one out of eight of them is 
not aware of their own HIV status.2  
One of the forefront government 
campaigns to halt the epidemic is to 
reduce the HIV risk among the 
populations and communities most 
affected by the disease. The first 
strategy is by initiating a national 
HIV testing and prevention campaign 
that encourages all adults to know 
their HIV status and protect 
themselves and their community by 
making HIV testing a part of their 
regular health routine.3  
To support the campaign, the 
government also includes the effort to 
reduce the stigma by promoting 
appropriate medical treatment to 
                                                 
1 CDC, “HIV in the United 
States | Statistics Overview | 
Statistics Center | HIV/AIDS | 




3 CDC, “The National 
HIV/AIDS Strategy | High-Impact 
HIV Prevention | Policy and Law | 
better the quality of life.4 
However, to date, there are also 
more than 30 states that have HIV-
specific criminal laws. The United 
Nations Global Commission on HIV 
and the Law had issued legal and 
policy recommendations that say HIV 
criminalization is not beneficial to 
further HIV prevention efforts. 
Commentators have been debating 
the use of criminal law over time.5 
At the same time, the use of tort 
law also gaining a considerable 
increase by those seeking 
compensation for HIV exposure 
incidences. While both laws have 
been upholding seemingly similar 
moral messages of disease 
prevention, there is a gap in 
investigating the comparison between 
the two laws. 
This paper is trying to answer the 
following inquiry: What is the 
difference in the moral reading 
between the use of criminal law and 





5 HIV Law Commission, 





tort law in addressing HIV prevention 
in the United States? 
The inquiry is self-explaining that 
the paper is presented as a piece of 
comparative study. Specifically, this 
paper uses the traditional descriptive 
comparison between criminal law 
and tort law under the American legal 
system with a nationwide 
jurisdictional scope. This selection of 
case coverage is purposively selected 
to gain a broader discussion on the 
differences between the two objects of 
study.  
This paper is intended to look at 
the comparison between the two 
branches of laws in developing 
principles on HIV prevention. HIV is 
a public health concern, and thus this 
paper measures the difference using 
the frame of reference of Ronald 
Dworkin's theory of law and morality 
and interpretation. The rationale 
behind this selection is because both 
criminal law and tort law on HIV 
exposure and transmission share the 
same importance of interpretation of 
law over observation and 
normativity.  
This comparison is trying to fill 
the gap of knowledge stretching 
between the discourse on HIV-
criminal law and HIV-tort law. This 
paper is organized as follows: (1) 
Introduction, (2) The Use of Criminal 
Law, (3) The Use of Tort Law, (4) The 
Moral Reading of the Comparison, 
(5) Conclusion.  
 
1. The Use of Criminal Law 
 
The inclination to use criminal 
                                                 
6 White, Graham, " Pre-
Exposure Prophylaxis (Prep) and 
Criminal Liability Under State HIV 
Laws", Yale Law Journal Forum, Vo. 
126, 2016, p. 77.  
7 Ibid. 
law as a tool to halt HIV transmission 
has been emanated since the adoption 
of the Ryan White Care Act, where the 
federal government requires each 
state to establish legal avenues in 
prosecuting HIV exposure as a 
condition to receive federal fund for 
AIDS treatment.6  
The majority of states have 
addressed HIV exposure in their 
criminal laws.7 The notion of 
criminalizing "HIV exposure" has 
been preferred instead of "HIV 
transmission" because by deterring 
HIV exposure, HIV transmission will 
be automatically prevented.8 The 
other reason is that HIV exposure 
criminalization will prevent people 
from intentionally expose HIV to 
others.9 
As an example, in the state of 
Washington, unlawful exposure to 
HIV is governed by RCW 9A.36.011: 
 
[A] person is guilty 
of assault in the first 
degree if he or she, 
with intent to inflict 
great bodily harm . . 
. administers, 
exposes, or transmits 
to or causes to be 
taken by another, 
poison, the human 
immunodeficiency 
virus as defined in 
chapter 70.24 RCW, 
or any other 
destructive or 
noxious substance . . 
8 Lazarini, Zita., et.al., " 
Evaluating the Impact of Criminal 
Laws on HIV Risk Behavior", 
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 
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While the above RCW 9A.36.011 
does not explicitly regulate possible 
defense in the statute, in the state of 
Washington, defense of consent is 
availing when a court can establish 
that the victim had consented to the 
intentional activity by the defendant 
to assault great bodily harm by 
running the risk of HIV exposure or 
transmission.11  
The purpose of the law is to stop 
the transmission of a deadly 
disease.12 The court could employ the 
reasonable test to see what a person 
does instead of examining who the 
person is.13 This means that it is also 
equally sufficient the crime element 
for the non-infected individual who 
injected HIV-infected blood into 
another person with the intent to 
inflict great bodily harm.14 By 
recognizing that every citizen has the 
same potential to commit the crime, it 
is undisputed that exclusively putting 
HIV−and not all sexually transmitted 
diseases−in the law is not a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause.15 
To suffice the charge, a court 
could construct the criminal intent by 
testing whether a defendant aware of 
his or her HIV-positive status when 
the assault carrying HIV exposure or 
transmission occurred.16  
For example, in State v. Stark, the 
defendant, had learned his HIV-
positive status and had received HIV 
prevention advice from counselors. 
                                                 
10 Washington Revised Code 
Annotated, § 9A.36.011, West. 
11 State v. Whitfield, 
Washington Appelate Vol. 132, 2006, 
p. 899.  




16 State v. Stark, Washington 
Still, he did not disclose his HIV 
status to the victims in activities 
known as risking HIV transmission.17 
Furthermore, he said to a third party, 
"I don't care. If I'm going to die, 
everybody's going to die."18 Based on 
the fact if he did not prevent HIV risks 
after knowing his HIV status and after 
he had the knowledge of HIV 
prevention, the court found that Stark 
sufficed the intent element.19  
The defense of consent has been 
exampled by athletic competition. In 
athletic competition, the competition 
participants are considered consent 
to reasonably foreseeable conduct 
during the competition, including 
when the conduct is a violation of the 
competition's rule.20  
As to the competition, Washington 
courts establishes that the sport in 
question must not be unlawful or 
prohibited by the law or public policy. 
Therefore, it will not mount a defense 
if the consent is given for unlawful 
activity, for example, in State v. Hiott, 
the court found that shooting a person 
with a BB gun, even with the victim's 
consent, does not constitute a defense 
of consent because it is against the 
law.21  
As for a more particular situation, 
consent to involve in an assault in 
incarceration is not a defense in State 
v. Weber, the defendant, consented to 
fight with his fellow inmates.22 The 
court found that consent to engage in 
fighting with inmates would not be a 
defense because "society has an 




20 State v. Shelley, 






interest in punishing assaults as 
breaches of the public peace and 
order so that an individual cannot 
consent to a wrong that is committed 
against the public peace."23 
Regarding HIV exposure and 
transmission, the defense can be 
granted if the fact shows a situation 
where the victim had consented to a 
reasonably foreseeable assault with 
intent to inflict great bodily harm by 
exposing or transmitting HIV.24 In-
State v. Whitfield, the defendant did 
not disclose his HIV status to any of 
the victims.25 The court did not grant 
the defense of consent because the 
defendant's intentional concealment 
of his HIV status was not a 
foreseeable behavior in a consensual 
sexual intercourse context.26 The 
court ruled that consent to consensual 
sex is not an equal meaning for 
consent to engage in an assault by 
exposing and putting HIV 
transmission risk with intent to inflict 
great bodily harm.27  
Consequently, to mount a defense, 
consent given by the victim is must 
include the victim's knowledge of the 
defendant's HIV status prior to the 
commission of the act.28 In Whitfield, 
the defendant did not disclose his HIV 
status to any of the victims, and 
therefore the court could not be 
persuaded by the defendant's 
assertions that the victim should have 
known the risk of HIV transmission or 
                                                 
23 Ibid.   
24 State v. Whitfield, loc. cit. 
25 Ibid.   
26 Ibid.   
27 Ibid.   
28 Ibid. at 898.  
29 Ibid 
30 Iowa Code Annotated, º§ 
709D.3, West.  
31 Minnesota State 
Annotated, § 609.2241, West. 
32 Cox, Brian, " Turning the 
exposure given their knowledge of 
Whitfield's promiscuity and high-risk 
behavior of drug use.29   
Similarly, in Iowa, the ICA § 
709D. Three explicitly governs that 
"[I]t is an affirmative defense to a 
charge . . . if the person exposed to the 
contagious or infectious disease knew 
that the infected person was infected 
with the contagious or infectious 
disease at the time of the exposure 
and consented to exposure with that 
knowledge."30 
However, Washington's law can 
be distinguished from the law in 
Minnesota where the explicit 
affirmative defense is governed by 
MSA § 609.2241 that "[I]t is an 
affirmative defense . . . that [the 
infected person] took practical means 
to prevent transmission as advised by 
a physician or other health 
professional . . . ."31 
At a national level, sexual activity 
and injecting drug use has been the 
main risk factor of HIV 
transmission.32 The risk of HIV 
transmission exists when a bodily 
fluid-carrying HIV is transmitted 
from a person living with HIB into the 
bloodstream of an HIV-negative 
individual.33 The risk of HIV 
transmission begins when a bodily 
fluid carrying the virus, including 
semen, pre-seminal fluid, blood, 
rectal fluid, vaginal fluid, or breast 
milk, is transmitted from a person 
Tide: The Future of HIV 
Criminalization After Rhoades v. 
State and Legislative Reform in 
Iowa", Northwestern Journal of 
Law & Social Policy, Vol. 11, 2016; 
HIV Transmission, Centers for 
Disease Control & Prevention, 
acceessed 18 March 2018, 
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/basics/trans
mission.html 
33 Ibid.  
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living with HIV into the bloodstream 
of an HIV-negative individual.34  
 
2.  The Use of Tort Law  
 
The first type of lawsuit to claim 
tort liability of HIV exposure is a 
battery. The battery happens when the 
person intentionally makes bodily 
contact with another person without 
the consent of the other person if such 
contact is harmful or offensive. 
Battery attracts the liability for 
emotional damages resulted from the 
tortious act.35  
What constitutes offensive contact 
is the absence or lack of consent to 
contact. Brzoska v. Olson exampled 
the use of the reasonable test to define 
this category.36 The plaintiff, a 
patient, filed a lawsuit against his 
HIV-positive dentist who performed a 
dental treatment without informing 
his HIV-positive status.37 However, 
The Supreme Court of Delaware 
decided that the fact that the dentist 
was HIV-positive did not make the 
treatment offensive unless the patient 
could prove the actual HIV 
                                                 
34 Ibid.  
35 Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, 1977, § 13; Lee, Sun Goo, "Tort 
Liability and Public Health: Marginal 
Effect of Tort Law on HIV 
Prevention", South Texas Law Review, 
Vol. 54, 2013, p. 684. 
The liability for battery is 
established if one “acts 
intending to cause a harmful 
or offensive contact with the 
person of the other or a third 
person, or an imminent 
apprehension of such a 
contact, . . . [and] a harmful 
contact with the person of the 
other directly or indirectly 
results.” 
36 Brzoska v. Olson, 
Delaware Supreme Court, Vol. 668, 
exposure.38 This means that the 
offensiveness of contact is decided 
based on an objective standard.39 
Brzoska also shows that the 
treatment by a healthcare provider is 
considered as an expressive consent 
of contact.40 Contrary to that, Delay 
v. Delay shows that in a sexual 
relationship, explicit consent by a 
sexual partner is required to avoid 
battery liability.41 
The other element of battery is the 
presence of intent to make contact. 
Courts have decided that the intent to 
have a sexual relationship suffices the 
intent in establishing battery.42 The 
courts held that defendants of this 
lawsuit need not have intended to 
transmit HIV.  
The court in Brzoska found that 
the intent to make contact element, 
despite the insufficiency of 
offensiveness element. Similarly, the 
transmission of HIV is not required to 
mount a battery. Offensive contact 
alone is theoretically sufficient for a 
battery.43 
The other form of tort liability 
claim is fraudulent 
1995, p. 1361.  
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. at 1366. 
41 Delay v. Delay, Florida 
District Court, Vol. 707, 1998, p. 
402;  Neal v. Neal, Idaho, Vol. 873, 
1994, p. 876-877);  Robinson v. 
Louie (In re Louie), The United 
States Bankruptcy Court of 
Northern District of California, Vol. 
213, 1997, p. 764.  
42 Doe v. Johnson, Western 
District of Michigan, Vol. 817, 1993, p. 
1384-1385. 
43 Robinson v. Louie (In re 
Louie), op. cit. at 763; Brzoska v. 
Olson, op. cit. at 1359-
1360; Martinez v. Brazen, Southern 
District of New York, No. 91 Civ. 
7769 (RPP) WL 93245, 1992, p. 
1; Neal v. Neal, loc. cit. 
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misrepresentation. It happens when a 
person misrepresents a fact, an 
opinion, an intention, or the law to 
induce another person to act or 
refrain from acting in reliance upon 
it, and the other person consequently 
suffers a pecuniary loss due to 
justifiable reliance on the 
misrepresentation.44 
HIV cases, as a non-commercial 
realm, also receive compensation 
when HIV individuals falsely 
represent their HIV status to others.45 
In Brzoska, the court found that HIV 
individuals are liable when they have 
either lied or failed to disclose the fact 
to others despite their duty to 
inform.46 
The duty to inform also held by the 
courts to HIV individuals regarding 
their HIV status unless they took other 
preventive measures.47 The silence of 
the infected individual asserts the 
message that the individual is not 
infected.48 
On the other hand, tort liability 
cannot be sufficed without the 
defendant's knowledge regarding his 
HIV status.49 This is also applied even 
                                                 
44 Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, op. cit. at 15 § 525. 
45 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. 
Sheft, The United States Court of 
Appeals for the 9th Circuit, Vol. 989, 
1993, p. 1108; Baranowski v. Torre, 
Connecticut Supreme Court, No. 
CV90-0236178 WL 240460, 1991, 
p. 2; Brzoska v. Olson, op. cit. at 
1367; Doe v. Dilling, Illinois 
Supreme Court, Vol. 888, 2008, p. 
39-40; J.B. v. Bohonovsky, The 
United States Dirstrict Court for the 
District of New Jersey, Vol. 835, 
1993, p. 797;  Robinson v. Louie (In 
re Louie), op.cit. at 761; Petri v. 
Bank of N.Y. Co., New York Supreme 
Court, Vol. 582, 1992, p. 613; Doe v. 
Johnson, op.cit. at 1388-1389.  
46 Brzoska v. Olson, op. cit. 
at 1367 
47 Oberman, Michelle, "Sex, 
Lies, and the Duty to Disclose", 
when the plaintiff expects 
constructive knowledge.50 However, 
constructive knowledge on HIV status 
requires a narrower condition to 
amount to this misrepresentation.51 
The courts also held that the 
plaintiff's reliance on the 
misrepresented fact of HIV status 
does not require evidence of the 
reliance, so long there is credence to 
the statement by the plaintiffs that 
they were not willing to be exposed to 
HIV.52 
Another form of tort liability 
claim is the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.53 This claim 
requires that the defendant 
intentionally or recklessly caused 
severe emotional distress by extreme 
and outrageous conduct.54 
Lying about HIV status is 
considered extreme and outrageous. 
Whelan v. Whelan shows that the 
court found that it is extreme and 
outrageous that the defendant was 
lying about having HIV while, in fact, 
he had not.55 This false statement, 
claimed by the wife-plaintiff, caused 
her severe emotional distress in 
Arizona Law Review, Vol. 47, 2005, 
p. 892. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Doe v. Doe, New York 
Supreme Court, Vol. 519, 1987, p. 596-
597.  
50 Ibid.  
51 Ibid. 
52 Larsson, Eric M., Talbot, 
Jean A,"Cause of Action to Recover 
Damages for Transmission of AIDS 
Through Negligence, 
Misrepresentation or Nondisclosure 
of Infected Status" 39 Causes of 
Action, 2009, p. 244-245.   
53 Hughes Training Inc. v. 
Cook, The United States Court of 
Appeals for the 5th Circuit, Vol. 254, 
2001, p. 594.   
54 Ibid. 
55 Whelan v. Whelan, 
Connecticut Supreme Court, Vo. 588, 
1991, p. 253.  
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different unexpected circumstances, 
including the fear of her son 
becoming an orphan.56 
Similarly, it is also considered 
extreme and outrageous to keep an 
HIV-positive status a secret even 
though the plaintiff was HIV-
negative.57 In Christian v. Shaft, the 
court awarded the plaintiff five 
million dollars as compensation for 
having a fear of contracting HIV. 
However, the plaintiff tested HIV-
negative more than sixteen times in 
four years after the exposure.58 
On whether the extreme and 
outrageous act, the plaintiff must 
establish that there is a suffering of 
severe emotional distress of being 
exposed to HIV.59 However, some 
courts held that HIV infection must be 
present to compensate for the claimed 
emotional distress.60 
In seeking tort claim from 
negligence, the plaintiff must prove 
that:  
 
(1) The defendant owed the 
plaintiff a duty of care;  
(2) that the defendant breached 
this duty;  
(3) that the defendant's conduct 
was both cause-in-fact and a 
proximate cause thereof;  
(4) that the defendant's conduct 
                                                 
56 Ibid. at 252. 
57 Shahvari, Mandana, 
"Comment, AfrAIDS: Fear of AIDS 
as a Cause of Action", Temple Law 
Review, Vol. 67, 1994, p. 782.  
58 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. 
Sheft, op.cit. at 1106.  
59 Robinson v. Louie (In 
reLouie), op.cit. 759; Kerins v. 
Hartley, California Court of Appeal, 
Vo. 33, 1994, p. 179-180; Petri v. 
Bank of N.Y. Co., loc.cit.  
60 Ibid. 
61 Dan B. Dobbs, Dan 
B,"The Law of Torts", 2000, p.2 § 1. 
62 Schoenstein, Richard 
caused harm to the plaintiff; and  
(5) the number of damages from 
the actual harm.61 
 
Duty of care is "a legally 
recognized obligation to conform to a 
certain standard of conduct towards 
another person."62 Duty of care in 
HIV cases means that HIV individuals 
have to either take preventive 
measures or disclose to others about 
the HIV risk before the risk run.63 
Negligence operates based on the 
foreseeable harm acknowledged by 
the defendant in maintaining the duty 
of care.64 This acknowledgment 
becomes an essential element and 
could be established by determining 
whether the defendant has either 
actual or constructive knowledge that 
the conduct could harm others.65 
The court in Doe v. Johnson 
strengthens the recognition of 
constructive knowledge as an 
expanded definition.66 The defendant 
asserted that he did not take 
preventive measures and did not warn 
the plaintiff because he did not seem 
aware of his HIV status at the time of 
the exposure.67 
Nonetheless, the court stated that 
knowledge of HIV infection could be 
reasoned for two reasons:  
 
Carl,  "Note, Standards of Conduct, 
Multiple Defendants, and Full 
Recovery of Damages in Tort 
Liability for the Transmission of 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus", 
Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 18, 1989, 
p. 50.  
63 Sun Goo Lee, op. cit. at 
639, 653 (2013). 
64  John B. v. Superior 
Court, California Supreme Court, Vol. 
137, 2006, p. 160.  
65 Ibid. 
66 Doe v. Johnson, op. cit. at 
1382  
67 Ibid. at 1386. 
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(1) the individuals experience 
HIV-related health symptoms; or  
(2) the individuals have actual 
knowledge regarding the 
HIV-positive status of their 
prior sexual partner.68 
 
The case of Plaza v. Estate of 
Wisser shows how a court could 
construct the causation relationship 
between the defendant's conduct and 
the fact of HIV infection to the 
plaintiff.69 The court did not use 
advanced medical technology to track 
the direction of the infection.70 
Instead, it used the surrounding 
circumstances that enable the court to 
draw a causal inference.71 The facts 
in the case include the HIV-positive 
status of the defendant that the 
plaintiff did not exchange blood or 
bodily fluids other than through sex, 
and he had never engaged in other 
HIV risked activities.72  
Consequently, the court must 
order disclosure of the defendant's 
HIV test result. In balancing the law 
of confidentiality, courts cited the 
exceptions that justify the order upon 
a compelling need to adjudicate a 
criminal or civil proceeding.73 
The court established that without 
the ability to obtain such medical 
information would deprive the 
plaintiff's possible recovery, hence 
contradictory to the public policy of 
protecting society from the spread of 
                                                 
68 Ibid.. at 1393.  
69 Plaza v. Wisser, New York 
Supreme Court, Vol. 626, 1995, p. 
446.  
70 Ibid. at 452. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 New York Public Health 
Law, 2013, § 2785(2)  
74 Plaza v. Wisser, op. cit. at 
454. 
75 Ibid. 
HIV infection.74 Moreover, it also 
contradicts the principle of requiring 
wrongdoers to compensate victims for 
the harms they suffered.75 
Regarding the extent of the actual 
harm element, it is clear that the fact 
of HIV infection from the defendant to 
the plaintiff satisfies the actual harm 
suffered.76 However, in other 
instances, tort liability could also be 
claimed when, otherwise, there is 
emotional harm instead of actual 
physical harm.77 
 
3.  The Moral Reading of the 
Comparison   
 
Compared to tort law, criminal 
law is often seen as providing more 
invasive and restrictive penalization. 
Criminal law also found as more 
covered by the media. It is also 
evident that criminal law is likely to 
be better perceived by people 
considering violating the law. 
The SERO Project also found that 
more than one out of four survey 
participants tested for HIV (26.8%) 
were counseled about the possibility 
of prosecution for undisclosed sexual 
activity.78 Research of 490 people 
shows that HIV-specific law did not 
significantly influence people's sexual 
behavior. Most survey participants 
asserted that it is wrong to expose 
76 Petri v. Bank of N.Y. Co., 
loc. cit.  
77 Ibid. 
78 Sprague, Laurel., Strub, 
Sean, "The SERO Project: National 
Criminalization Survey, Preliminary 
Results", The Sero Project, 2012, 







HIV to others.79 
The conflict between the use of 
criminal law and public health 
imperatives has been growing in the 
moral question of the purpose of 
criminal law. Deterrence is the 
obvious outcome. However, it is also 
making the avoided conduct more 
secretive. The conduct will be less 
detected, but the unwanted impacts 
would still occur. The interest to take 
HIV testing may be reduced, thus 
jeopardizing public health messages.  
Consequently, the use of criminal 
law would have a less moral question 
if it is formulated base on retribution, 
not as a contribution to stopping HIV. 
Criminalization might have a claim to 
further public health purposes. 
However, its unintended 
consequences could counter-
productive against the claim itself. At 
this point, one can question whether 
punishment is justified for the 
conduct.  
Utilitarian reasons could argue 
that when the law is against public 
health objectives, it is an infringement 
of the people's right not to be 
punished.80 Moreover, because 
punishment has its stigmatizing 
dimension, then the moral test could 
                                                 
79 Burris, Scott., et al., "Do 
Criminal Laws Influence HIV Risk 
Behavior? An Empirical Trial", 
Arisona State Law Journal, Vol. 39, 
2007, p. 467.  
80 Husak, Douglas, 
"Overcriminalization: The Limits of 
the Criminal Law", Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2008, p. 
92.   
81 Ibid. at 94; Andrew von 
Hirsch, Andrew von., Ashworth, 
Andrew, "Proportionate Sentencing: 
Exploring the Principles", Oxford 
University Press, 2005, p. 134.  
Disproportionate 
punishments are unjust not 
because they possibly may 
extent to its proportionality.81   
This conflict of the purpose of 
using criminal law represents 
Dworkin's ongoing skepticism on 
constructive interpretation.82 
Infesting a meaning to criminal law 
as a tool for HIV prevention opens the 
door to the misconception that it is 
betraying HIV prevention itself.83 
Dworkin says that interpretation must 
be of purpose and not cause.84 This 
misconception suggests when 
criminal law has become the cause of 
the problem. Then it can be subjected 
with a constructive interpretation and 
give the driving element back to the 
purpose: HIV prevention.  
Based on the facts that courts 
have awarded financial 
compensation to those exposed to 
HIV, it clearly shows the ability to use 
tort liability as a part of HIV 
response. Unlike criminal law, the 
development of tort law's legal 
interpretation of different situations 
regarding HIV exposure and 
transmission makes tort law more 
adaptive to address the purpose of 
law between plaintiff and defendant.  
The courts also mentioned in their 
decisions that there is an expectation 
that tort liability can prevent new HIV 
be ineffectual or possibly 
counterproductive, but 
because they purport to 
condemn the actor for his 
conduct and yet visit more 
or less censure on him than 
the degree of 
blameworthiness of that 
conduct would warrant. 
82 Dworkin, Ronald, "Law’s 
Empire", The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, London, 
1986, p. 79. 
83 Ibid.. at 83. 
84 Ibid. at 52. 
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infections and slow the epidemic. 
However, the success of this 
expectation has been in question by 
commentators. 
There has been no study that 
investigates the relationship between 
tort law and the decisions of HIV-
positive people to engage in risky 
behaviors. Without knowing the law, 
the law cannot influence their 
behavior in terms of compliance in 
HIV prevention, which might result 
from ignorance toward the law.85  
Unlike criminal law, the moral 
part of tort law lies in the financial 
liability that might be imposed for 
morally wrong conduct. However, 
this purpose is an outlier of the 
common purpose of tort law, where 
financial liability can economically 
benefit in commercial settings.  
In the United States, bringing a 
lawsuit is an additional financial 
burden. In contrast, HIV has been a 
disease of economically 
disadvantaged groups in the United 
States, and thus plaintiffs are risking 
being not paid after winning the case. 
This underrepresented moral 
message makes the public health 
purpose of tort law more 
overshadowed by criminal law.  
The basic idea of tort law is 
responsibility. Thus one can test the 
case laws with Dworkin's question of 
jurisprudence: What makes a good 
reason for a court's decision? 
Questioning "good" reasons are 
equivalent to a moral question. Under 
tort law, reasons then became 
quantified into an amount of money 
that meets the satisfactory level of the 
injured. Without appropriate 
injunction order, this would define 
                                                 
85 Galletly, Carol L., et. al., 
"HIV-Positive Persons' Awareness 
and Understanding of Their State's 
tort law as a trade constituting 
economic valuation of morality. 
As a comparison, moral reading 
in criminal law highlights the 
justifiability of criminalization. 
Contextually, by meaning relative to 
the epidemic picture, criminalization 
of HIV transmission and exposure 
could be situated in the wrong place 
and at the wrong time. The moral 
responsibility in criminal law stays 
somewhere in the statutory law-
making processes. 
Tort law, on the other hand, poses 
a morality question at the judicial 
decision dimension of law-making 
processes. However, the moral 
reading is limited to the tort law 
requirement where emotional injury 
would not be granted. At the same 
time, tort law has been the main 
avenue to meet emotional satisfaction 
over financial claims sought from 
other's wrongs, where judges play a 
considerable role in finding good 
reasons for a decision.  
Overall, Dworkin's discussion on 
interpretation plays a considerable 
role in finding the meaning of using 
criminal and tort law as a part of HIV 
intervention. The moral reading also 
pictured how distant the actual use of 
these laws and the public health 
imperatives of HIV prevention as a 




 Both criminal law and tort 
law have been developing similar 
liability principles regarding HIV 
exposure and transmission under the 
United States' common law tradition. 
For HIV prevention itself, both 
Criminal HIV Disclosure Law",  AIDS 
& Behavior, Vol. 13, 2009, p. 1262. 
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criminal law and tort law play a 
negative marginal role in gaining 
public health purposes in reversing 
the HIV epidemic. Criminal law has 
been scrutinized as not aligned with 
the purpose of law where 
misconceptions exist in both 
substantive dimension and the 
underlying moral claim. Tort law, on 
the other hand, suffers an even less 
moral claim on public health 
purposes. However, tort law 
maintains a consistent narrow 
purpose of financial liability.  
 This study exhibits a lesson 
for other countries, especially for 
countries with relatively high burden 
of HIV or other communicable 
diseases. The United States' 
experience is a valuable starting 
point for comparable studies in civil 
law countries. In Asia and the Pacific, 
democracies like Indonesia could be 
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